This book deals with the modern threat of terrorism and
counterinsurgency strategy in the 21st century and a must read for
all those who want to understand the intricacies and different methodology of countering this modern scourge. Released by the U.S. government in December of 2006 is now published by a university press (University of Chicago, paper, $15), and now includes a new forward and introduction that swears to the manuals content which counters most of the notions on
counterinsurgency. The manual was born out of the necessity of having a revised edition of the old field manuals (Army 1986 edition/ Marine 1980 edition) that needed a major overhaul. This was in the face of concurrent military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were the U.S. armed forces was largely unprepared due to lack of needed intelligence information, linguistic capabilities, force structures and civil affairs know-how or capacity to train other countries armed forces. the American high command knew they had to have a more updated manual to reflect the new counterinsurgency strategies as they were conducting campaigns in the Middle East.The lead creator of the manual is Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, now the overall commander in Iraq highlighted the need for economic as well as political development in addition to the military action. He is credited for having asked his soldiers, "What have you done for the people of Iraq today?" He invited a diverse collection of resource persons to help craft a draft of the manual which included academicians, human rights lawyers, counterinsurgency experts, and journalist to Fort Levenworth. What came out of the assembly was manual whose basic premise asserts that to be successful in counterinsurgency you have to protect the civilian population. It notes that "An operation that kills five
insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 50 more insurgents."It advises that the approximate armed force need for counterinsurgency is not gaged from the number of insurgents but by the number of the population in a particular area of operation. Ideally 20 counterinsurgents per 1,000 inhabitants is prescribed by the manual. It emphasizes the importance of coordination with the civilian agencies for reconstruction and development work. One of the most difficult premise put forth in the manual is the necessity of intelligence gathering done at great risk for the ultimate end of getting greater safety in return. Statements contradicting the old ideas abound in the manual: "Sometimes the more you protect the force, the less secure you may be." "Sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is." "Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction."The military will not succeed unless it gets the cooperation and support of the civilian leadership and provides for some of its needs. This is because the military do not have the expertise for nation building. The manual also prescribes many long years for counterinsurgency utilizing a greater number of soldiers for total success of the mission. This will weigh heavily on the American public, as casualties mount day by day an exit strategy becomes more and more attractive option.