This book examines the effect of regulation on
competition in long-distance telephone markets after the 1984 breakup of the
Bell System. Thus, it is a useful guide to the thinking of the leaders in the industry, Congress, and the state regulatory commissions on how far to proceed in relying on regulatory agencies to establish
competition in key public utility markets. The author is the Williams Brothers Professor of Management Studies at the Yale School of Management and former economic adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush.
With the antitrust decree breaking up the Bell System in 1984, the federal court overseeing the final court judgment took on the task of determining how markets for long-distance telephone service would evolve from a regulated public utility to an open,
competitive structure. Dividing out this task, the Justice Department was to monitor the growth of competition, and the Federal Communications Commission was to regulate entry and prices. In effect, three regulatory organizations, including the antitrust court, through daily rulemaking, were to set out conditions that would replace regulation redundant with markets dominated by competitive entry and pricing.