Part 2It seems equally clear that none of these could be sufficient conditionsfor science either. Biblical exegesis relies
onobservation. Spiritual regeneration is a repeatable event (by another"experimenter", that is). Theological doctrines are, at leastin principle, falsifiable. And math and logic conform to a type oflaw. Yet none of these, by virtue of the presence of those elements, wouldbe considered
scientific.The point is simply this: Apart from a clear line of demarcationidentifying both necessary and
sufficient conditions for science, it ispresumptuous to exclude intelligent creation from the field of science.If, on the other hand, science is defined not by necessary and sufficientconditions, but by a constellation of endeavors that generally characterizeclear-cut cases of science, that allows us to make meaningful distinctionsbetween science and non-science. However, this method also qualifiesintelligent design as scientific because it employs that same constellation oftechniques the other disciplines do.One other element--the notion of external conceptual problems--bears onthe issue of the singular authority of science in the area of knowledge.These are problems raised in a discipline outside of science that arereasonable and rationally justified, yet conflict with the conclusions ofscience.For example, one conclusion of science may reduce man to a brain and abody, denying the metaphysical dimension of the soul. Man is simply amachine made of meat, locked in a mechanistic universe of cause andeffect. If, however, other disciplines--like philosophy, ethics, ortheology--could provide legitimate reasons for the existence of the soul, thiswould weigh against the "scientific" conclusion. In the twentieth century, science has become an elitist, parochialenterprise. This is unwarranted. First, there is no clear set ofconditions--either necessary or sufficient--that distinguish science fromnon-science. Second, even if there were, non-scientific enterprises likephilosophy, theology, and ethics might contribute legitimate, defensibleconclusions that represent problems for some scientific views. Well-justified conclusions from other disciplines ought not be dismissedout of hand. To disregard a view simply because it's"religious" or "theological" is obscurantist. Iftruth is really the object of the scientific enterprise, scientists shouldwelcome it from any source.