Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, by Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinser, is the most elaborate
and well researched account of the factors that led to the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. The book recounts the modern history of a country struggling with extreme inequality, and how the interests of the United States, particularly the United Fruit Company, played into that struggle. The story begins with the fall of Dictator Jorge Ubico and the rise of the first popularly elected President of Guatemala, a teacher, Juan José Arévalo, in 1945. Arévalo enacted a wide array of reforms, among them the consolidation of democracy, the protection of labor, mild agrarian reform, and a host of other liberties associated with a modern democracy. In what was a relatively tumultuous transfer of power, Jacobo Arbenz became Guatemala’s second popularly elected president in 1951. In 1952, Arbenz engineered the passage of land reform legislation which drastically affected the holdings of the United Fruit Company. A vicious U.S. public relations campaign ensued eventually leading to the covert toppling of Arbenz’s regime under accusations of communism. Guatemala was then ruled by successive right-wing dictators, all supported by the U.S. politically and financially, enduring political violence the likes of which very few countries have seen, until the 1996 signing of the peace accords. The most
interesting questions raised by the book, have to do with Arbenz’s ability to hold on to power even without U.S. intervention. The well-reasoned conclusions of Schlesinger and Kinzer imply that it probably wouldn’t have been possible to topple his regime. Yet it is still important to remember the precarious situations under which Arévalo and Arbenz ruled, spoiling dozens of plots to topple their governments. These plots were most likely the product of a very angry Guatemalan aristocracy, and were countered solely by the loyalty of military. The military was kept in check by the peasant masses which favored the policies of Arévalo and Arbenz, the most frightening threats by the presidents being the arming of peasant militias. The most interesting question, and one that will never be known, involves the succession of Arbenz and whether or not the reforms would have continued independent of U.S. intervention. Even these questions, however, fail to even remotely excuse the actions of the U.S. government in Guatemala. Not only was a democratically elected leader overthrown, but successive Guatemalan dictators were supported, resulting in 92% of the 200,000 violent deaths that occurred through the period. The CIA continued to play a role until the late 80s and early 90s involved in the killing of a U.S. citizen and the husband of another U.S. citizen. In 1999, Bill Clinton finally put for an important statement “For the United States it is important that I state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence units which engaged in violence and widespread repression was wrong, and the United States must not repeat that mistake”, but it still has done little to right the wrongs that the U.S. has committed in Guatemala.