By 1945, as Hitler's Germany was coming to an end, the future of the European continent seemed uncertain. Soviet troops were just forty-five miles outside of Berlin, and the Allied troops were just about to cross the Rhine. The questioned remained: how would the war affect the balance of
power and the political landscape in the years to come? On Feb 4, 1945, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Franklin Roosevelt met to answer this very question at Yalta, a seaside Crimean resort on the coast of the Black Sea. While the conventional wisdom of modern historians is that Churchill and Roosevelt did not wield their collective power, this
paper argues that it was Stalin who failed to realize the opportunities available to him and conceded too much. The paper shows that the
negotiations can be viewed from a classic "Power-Interest-
Rights" perspective. While Stalin
negotiated from a
position of power, FDR and Churchill negotiated from positions of rights and interests, respectively. It is the consensus of this paper that Stalin failed to use his dominant position of power, giving Churchill and FDR unnecessary concessions. The paper includes illustrations and tables. Table of Contents: Introduction to the Yalta Negotiations Three Approaches to Resolving Differences Three Allied Leaders German Dismemberment German Reparations The Role of Post-War France The Polish Question The United Nations Final Thoughts The Negotiation Time Line Value Creation Worksheet Bibliography