The din and dazzle of the three-day official
visit of US
President George W Bush is yet to settle. The ruckus
created by the Left-Muslim anti-US lobby and the
controversy over the Indo-US
nuclear understanding have
left a long shadow over the national psyche.
It is the first time in India´s history that a visiting
dignitary was subjected to the kind of hostile hooliganism,
that too by a section of the ruling coalition. So much so
that the usual courtesy of the address by the US President
to the joint session of Parliament was abandoned.
The anti-Bush protesters could not articulate any India
specific agenda for their uncustomary exuberance. The
communists have in the bargain become the political
expression of the Jehadis, Talibans and other extremist
outfits masquerading as protectors of Islam. The line up
has made it easy for us to understand the otherwise
complicated import of the nuclear partnership. In some
situations an action is explained better by the reaction.
The protests were organised largely by the same segment
which violently opposed India´s Pokharan II implosion in
1998, which established the
country as a nuclear power.
They were one with the countries who imposed
sanctions on
India, which included the US, and their argument was that
India was engaged in an armamental race and that a poor
country like India cannot afford to go nuclear. The
Marxists, who worship Stalin and Mao as their icons, have
no right to protest Bush´s visit in the name of crime
against humanity. They did not protest General Musharraf´s
visit to India—rather they warmly welcomed him—though he
imposed a bloody and treacherous war on India in 1999. The
Marxist objection to the nuclear
deal ironically is because
it allegedly goes against Chinese interest. Are they
protectors of Chinese interests in India?
However, there are genuine concerns in India about the
contours of the Indo-US deal. The Indian nuclear programme
is completely swadeshi and the country has refused to sign
the NPT all these years because of its belief that it has a
right to develop a credible nuclear deterrent for defence
purposes, because of the peculiar strategic position in
which it is located. And this programme was developed
entirely indigenously, unlike some other countries who
either stole or borrowed the technology. It is not possible
to give away this passionately nurtured expertise.
The fear is that the deal will in some way cripple this
initiative. The separation of Indian reactors into civilian
and military will involve a huge additional financial
burden on the country. And it will lead to a situation
where the scientists and technocrats working in the
military segment will have to face a kind of professional
apartheid and resource crunch. If that happens it will only
be a matter of time before the Indian nuclear deterrent
capability becomes obsolete and weak.
There is also the apprehension that US is out to dump its
outdated nuclear energy
technology on India. And the
country will be saddled with huge nuclear waste pile up and
their disposal could create new problems for us. But all
these are in the long term. Diplomacy is not an open and
shut situation. It is a game of endurance, perseverance,
persistence and patience. It is a balance between national
interest and practical strategy. The Indo-US entente on the
nuclear front is a story in continuation. It was the
excellent, nimble footed diplomatic offensive undertaken by
the Vajpayee government soon after the Pokharan II that
culminated in the visit of Bill Clinton as US President to
India in 2000 and the lifting of the sanctions by most
western regimes. The present deal in a sense ends India´s
nuclear isolation. The deal to some degree is a sequence to
the NDA policy. India needs investment and technology. The
US wants to tap the Indian market. The nuclear deal is only
one step forward. The watchword is: cautious optimism.
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