empire

It is a miserable state of mind, to have few things to desire, and
many things to fear; and yet that commonly is the case of kings;
who, being at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes their
minds more languishing; and have many representations of perils and
shadows, which makes their minds the less clear. And this is one
reason also, of that effect which the Scripture speaketh of, That
the king''s heart is inscrutable. For multitude of jealousies, and lack
of some predominant desire, that should marshal and put in order all
the rest, maketh any man''s heart, hard to find or sound. Hence it
comes likewise, that princes many times make themselves desires, and
set their hearts upon toys; sometimes upon a building; sometimes
upon erecting of an order; sometimes upon the advancing of a person;
sometimes upon obtaining excellency in some art, or feat of the
hand; as Nero for playing on the harp, Domitian for certainty of the
hand with the arrow, Commodus for playing at fence, Caracalla for
driving chariots, and the like. This seemeth incredible, unto those
that know not the principle, that the mind of man is more cheered and
refreshed by profiting in small things, than by standing at a stay in
great. We see also that kings that have been fortunate conquerors,
in their first years, it being not possible for them to go forward
infinitely, but that they must have some check, or arrest in their
fortunes, turn in their latter years to be superstitious, and
melancholy; as did Alexander the Great; Diocletian; and in our memory,
Charles the Fifth; and others: for he that is used to go forward,
and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favor, and is not the thing
he was.   
To speak now of the true temper of empire, it is a thing rare and
hard to keep; for both temper, and distemper, consist of contraries.
But it is one thing, to mingle contraries, another to interchange
them. The answer of Apollonius to Vespasian, is full of excellent
instruction. Vespasian asked him, What was Nero''s overthrow? He
answered, Nero could touch and tune the harp well; but in
government, sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, sometimes
to let them down too low. And certain it is, that nothing destroyeth
authority so much, as the unequal and untimely interchange of power
pressed too far, and relaxed too much.   
This is true, that the wisdom of all these latter times, in princes''
affairs, is rather fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers and
mischiefs, when they are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep
them aloof. But this is but to try masteries with fortune. And let men
beware, how they neglect and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared
for no man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may come. The
difficulties in princes'' business are many and great; but the greatest
difficulty, is often in their own mind. For it is common with
princes (saith Tacitus) to will contradictories, Sunt plerumque
regum voluntates vehementes, et inter se contrariæ. For it is the
solecism of power, to think to command the end, and yet not to
endure the mean.   
Kings have to deal with their neighbors, their wives, their
children, their prelates or clergy, their nobles, their
second-nobles or gentlemen, their merchants, their commons, and
their men of war; and from all these arise dangers, if care and
circumspection be not used.   
First for their neighbors; there can no general rule be given (for
occasions are so variable), save one, which ever holdeth, which is,
that princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do
ever grow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by
approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them, than
they were. And this is generally the work of standing counsels, to
foresee and to hinder it. During that triumvirate of kings, King Henry
the Eighth of England, Francis the Fof France, and Charles
the Fifth Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three
could win a palm of ground, but the other two would straightways
balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war; and
would not in any wise take up peace at interest. And the like was done
by that league (which Guicciardini saith was the security of Italy)
made between Ferdinando King of Naples, Lorenzius Medici, and
Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, the one of Florence, the other of Milan.
Neither is the opinion of some of the Schoolmen, to be received,
that a war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent injury, or
provocation. For there is no question, but a just fear of an
imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of a
war.