Hume's Law - or better known as the "Is-Ought Problem" - is a fundamental problem in meta-ethics raised by David Hume in
his Treatise, that says, in brief, that ought (or
prescriptive) statements cannot be derived from is (or descriptive) statements. As an example, from the descriptive statement "This water is dirty" one cannot derive the normative statement "So you should not drink it".
Much fuss and noise has been made over the epistemological implications of the problem (for the field of ethics). My purpose here is not as much episemological as it is metaphysical, assuming, for the while, that Hume's Law is true. From that assumption I contend there exists a non-
empirical world that cause prescriptive statements to be made, and which must also be the source of Morality (or normativity)... in the following way:
1. Is-statements cannot be derived from Ought-statements (Hume's Law; assumed).
2. To state that something Is, is to describe a state of affair (a truism).
3. To state that something Ought to, is to prescribe a state of affair (a truism).
4. It is indubitable that descriptive statements are made; and it is equally indubitable prescriptive statements are made (truisms).
5. Descriptive statements are made because we have the ability to describe; also, prescriptive statements are made because we have the ability to prescribe (truisms).
7. The use of our abilities to make descriptive and prescriptive statements either implies the existence of descriptive and prescriptive things as being out there, or not being out there.
8. Descriptive things are out there (an empirical presupposition); and descriptive statements state the nature of their affairs (a necessary epistemological assumption).
9. Like descriptive things being descriptively stated, prescriptive things are also prescriptively stated (a tautology).
10. Prescriptive statements are stated, like descriptive statements are (another variation of the tautology above).
11. Because, like descriptive things causing descriptive statements, it follows there must be prescriptive things causing prescriptive statements, or non-descriptive (but also non-prescriptive things) causing prescriptive statements, or that prescriptive statements are uncaused.
12. The existence of Prescriptive things is dubious: it does not even make sense.
13. To say prescriptive statements are causeless is as absurd as saying descriptive statements are causeless.
14. It follows by the method of elimination that prescriptive statements must be caused by non-descriptive, non-empirical, non-observable, also non-prescriptive, things or Thing.
18. We can therefore infer the existence of a non-empirical world, or entity, or Thing (you name it), that causes prescriptive statements to be made.
19. In conclusion, the empirical world is not all there is to reality; and because precriptive statements are the source of morality, morality must come from that non-empirical world.
I do not know whether this argument, or a closely related one, or even a remotely related one, is already made in the philosophical literature. Because I assume there is none, I claim proper authority to this argument, and for the same reason, is accountable to its formulation and defense. Whether this argument will stand up to intense scrutiny, or whether it will just be another fallacious argument resulting either from sloppy reasoning or wrong metaphysical presuppositions, remains to be seen. For now, so far as I'm concerned, the truth of its conclusion, assuming the truth of Hume's Law, is unassailable.
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