Anyone who found themselves
accepting utilitarianism would argue that there are some cases where the death
penalty
is not only morally acceptable but also morally required. For example, as presented in the article by
Scott Turow, the execution of a mass
murderer could promote the most pleasure
by creating closure for the grieving families of the victims, ridding society
of a dangerous and possibly incurable
criminal, creating a moral order by
punishing murderers more harshly than other criminals, not allowing the
criminal to be better off than his or her dead victim, and perhaps opening up a
space in the already crowded prison system. The other most viable option, life
in prison, would still create pleasure in some of the same ways, but it would
not be as much as execution. The criminal would be able to continue to
experience intellectual pleasures through books and the family of the victim(s)
would still gain pleasure from the knowledge that the criminal was safe behind
bars. Kant (if he could indeed accept my restriction) and I believe that this
man should still be allowed to live because of the basic premise that life is
sacred and it is our duty to treat his as an end. As a human, unless mentally
deficient or insane, the criminal is a rational agent and would strive to
retain his life. To treat him as an end would be to respect that will and allow
him to live. A utilitarian would argue that this person has not treated the
life of others as sacred and may continue to do so. Thus, for the overall good
of society and the greatest reduction of pain, the man should be killed. Kant
would reply that the overall level of pain is not what matters in this case.
The death penalty is basically government-sanctioned revenge for murder,
fundamentally like the Code of Hammurabi that calls for “an eye for an eye.”
This would not be acting under a good will and thus is not valuable and never
the right action. Eric McIntosh offers the Kantian objection, “But then, if a
family really values the death of the murderer of their loved one, wouldn’t it
be treating them as an end and not merely a means?” Kant would respond that
killing the murderer is not considered duty because the desire of the family is
not a rational desire because it does not treat the murderer as an end. Thus,
the death of the murderer is not morally required to appease the family.
When
it comes down to it, I agree with Kant that our duty lies in treating other
people as ends because it counts for a certain level of respect. To treat
someone as an end, you must respect them as people and thus respect also their
individual rights. Simply subscribing to the hedonistic point of view leaves
room for large amounts of self-interest, which does not exhibit a good will and
is thus not valuable.