Randolf Cooper’s work is an important addition to our understanding of the making of early colonial rule in India. It looks
at the
military culture of the Marathas, the most important indigenous power in eighteenth century India. Cooper argues for a reevaluation of British military superiority and contends that the Anglo-Maratha
campaigns represented the high water mark of Maratha power and that the British victory of Assaye in 1803 was determined as much by finance, politics and intelligence as by the actual military maneuvers on the battlefields. He is not, however, the first historian to come up with such a proposition – there are a number of writings that have suggested the nexus between indigenous capital and imperial expansion.
For Cooper, the Maratha campaigns go far beyond the tactical game. These constitute a complex contest between two cultures with contrasting perceptions of conflict and resolution and which in turn made assumptions about the adversary’s motives and moves fragile and faulty. It is his contention that the Anglo-Maratha campaign of 1803 demonstrates the degree to which a western power misread an Asian opponent. It is this gap that engages Cooper’s attention; without discounting the fact of British victory, he proceeds to interrogate the explanations offered for British victory and turn our attention to the vitality and dynamism of Maratha military culture that was deliberately silenced in the emerging historiography of British military superiority.
In understanding the intricacies of Maratha military culture, Cooper focuses on the political and military economy of the eighteenth century.The Maratha clan leaders never ignored possibilities of financial advantage; if they could save or make money at British expense, they would. They were veteran entrepreneurs in the south Asian military economy and one way to increase potential campaign profits was to outsource ammunition requirements at an ally’s expense. This approach was in part the fall out of the Maratha debacle at Panipat in 1761.