Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.
Author: Jaegwon Kim
For
over more than thirty years, Kim has held a number of different positions on the mind/body problem. In a way, his philosophical journey reflects the history of the philosophy of mind itself. Though he started supporting the old identity thesis, in the decades to come he developed a specific brand of reductive physicalism. This change was due in no small part to the rise of the supervenience thesis in the mind/body debate. Supervenience made clear how mental properties could, in principle, be allowed without giving up physicalism: the mental is still wholly determined by the physical. One of the first to question the status of multiple realization as a guarantee for the autonomy of the special sciences, Kim began advocating reductionism in an anti-reductionist age. His attack on non-reductive physicalism has by now reached its most impressive stage: the so-called causal exclusion argument strips mental evens of their causal efficacy. This is one of the key points of Physicalism or Something Near Enough.
The book consists of six chapters. These chapters are written in an essay style: they can be read independently (indeed, some of the chapters are really written accounts of lectures). At the very beginning is a handy synopsis, which covers most if not all the arguments per section, allowing for a quick pinpointing of a topic or passage.
As I have already mentioned, central to Kim’s philosophy is what he calls the causal exclusion argument. Most striking about this argument is its simplicity (simplicity, that is, for the reader already familiar with the theories and jargon of the philosophy of mind). Suppose there is a mental property M which supervenes on a physical property P. Suppose further that M causes a mental event M*, which in turn supervenes on P*. Why does M* occur? Because it is caused by M and because it is realized by P*. However, P* is alone sufficient for M* to occur. The only way M can be said to cause M* therefore, is if M causes P*. But, since M is realized by P, this boils down to saying that P* is caused by P, which is sufficient for P*. The real causal work is done at the physical level: P* is caused by P. There is nothing M can contribute in addition to what P has already contributed; it alone causes P*. The relations between M and M*, and between M and P* therefore, are not really instances of causation.
This, in a nutshell, is what fuels Kim’s attack on non-reductive physicalism. The first two chapters of the book engage in detailed analysis of this argument, elaborating on its consequences, considering and rejecting a series of demanding objections and alternatives. With great clarity of reasoning, he argues against the possibility of causal overdetermination, before countering Ned Block’s Causal Drainage objection with an intellectual vigor that makes it exciting to read (something of a rarity in this particular area of philosophy).
Crucial as this argument is to Kim’s own position, the book goes beyond it to cover a wide array of topics, ranging from interesting alternatives to physicalism, such as a renewed approach to ontological dualism in the third chapter, to vexing problems such as those connected with functional reduction and type-physicalism, discussed in chapters four and five respectively. In the fourth chapter, the author clarifies and defends his own stand on the mind/body problem, while the fifth chapter focuses on some possible explanatory arguments for a position regaining popularity among theorists in this area: that of type-physicalism. The analysis offered shows that the explanatory arguments are ultimately untenable. It seems then, thatKim’s non-reductive physicalism is the only viable option left open.
Then, is there no drawback to Kim’s position? Is the road ahead completely clear? Not completely clear. Only with respect to the difficult issue of qualia, does Kim have to admit that his reductive physicalism, as it hinges on expressing contingent identities between functionally analyzable mental properties and the physical base upon which they supervene, falls short of its goal. Certain qualia seem to defy any attempt at functionalization, and are hence irreducible. On the author’s view, this does not mean that we have to abandon physicalism: we will just have to learn to live with a mental residue. Does this matter? Not for Kim, as he makes clear in the final section of the book. As this residue consists of mere epiphenomena, we won’t miss it a bit.
To any reader who has the stomach (and, it must be said, the necessary foreknowledge) to challenge his or her own views on some of the most baffling issues in the philosophy of mind, Physicalism or Something Near Enough is truly a book to read. Clarity of thought, intellectual engagement and philosophical drive all conspire to make this book the masterpiece that it is. Anybody who wants to see the latest developments in the mind/body debate for him or herself, and to witness the action from the frontline, should read and enjoy this book.