Aristotle's Contradiction Part III
I’d like to talk now briefly about
akrasia, or the ability to act when you
believe you are
doing what is
wrong. Plato believed it does not exist. Aristotle said that when acting of desire, this isn’t the case. Every person deliberates to some degree on his or her own actions, so is it possible? Can people truly undertake an action that they believe to be wrong?
Looking at Aristotle’s model of virtue, then can’t anything be right if you consider it to be so? He thinks that virtue is simply
good habits, but if that’s the case, who determines what good habits are? Does the individual or society as a whole? Even cannibals have a reason for killing besides just the sake of killing. In this type of circumstance, I think it’s important to consider the role of others and the effect an individual's actions have on them. Is it that if one enforces his/her own will upon another without believing themselves to be justified, that they have committed akrasia perhaps? It is not that they do not believe that they will attain SOME benefit, or that for SOME reason it is “right”, but that they believe that the majority of the reasons for doing this thing or the outcome of this thing are wrong, and they chose to follow the small number of things they found to be right.
Is there a difference between what a person thinks is best at the moment for himself, and what is best for all involved? Speaking on an individual level, if someone is a crack addict, and chooses to continue to do crack knowing it is wrong, does he really think he’s doing what is good? Akrasia is committed when upon deliberation you accept false justification from the side you believe to be wrong, in an attempt to rationalize what you want. It does not mean what you think or do is good, but perhaps desirable at the time. There is a large difference between desire and
pleasure, and what is good. They do not necessarily go hand and hand. Even Aristotle said that murder in cold blood, is wrong. Rape is wrong. Justifying it with narcissistic and animalistic reasoning does not change that.
Let us take a rapist, for example. He might enjoy sex, but the truth is that he is mad at his parent(s) for some deep seeded psychological reason; and he wants to take it out on every woman he sees that reminds him of “mommy”. Does it make it good in his eyes even? What he thinks is good is the act of seeking revenge on his parents, but not the act of rape itself. It is more the concept of hurting his parents that he finds right. He has found some outlet for his anger, but he knows it is wrong. Just as Hobbes believed that we only act in our own self-interest, it does not mean that it is why we act. Just because one acts in their own self-interest does not mean that they acted BECAUSE of self-interest.
It is not, with akrasia, that the act of doing is good, but that the end is considered good, and therefore, akrasia is possible. A rapist does not believe it’s good to rape, he believes it’s good to seek revenge. Perhaps this is not the case with all rapists, but it is possible.
If something gives pleasure, but destroys us, then how can it be good or right? I just don’t see how desire or pleasure can be used as a synonym with the intention of doing something right or good every time. Aristotle believed that the ultimate good is
happiness, that happiness is concerned with pleasure and pains, and that “virtue of character” is concerned with pleasure and pains. If that is true, and in doing something because of desire makes it so that we are knowingly doing what we think is right, then any time we do something that causes great pain we must actually be doing what is wrong. Again, it seems to me that it is not that we do something because we necessarily think it’s right, but because the ends or reason for doing it is right, not the action itself. In thisrespect, I think that Aristotle was correct in his assertation that akrasia is possible, and that it seems to be driven by desire, but he contradicts himself with his explanation of akrasia, and his beliefs in what is right/wrong good/bad or virtuous.
Aristotle’s biggest downfall here is his proposition that virtue is not inherent. He himself deems certain things as being strictly wrong; but any given society can, by his model, choose to deem them right. He ties happiness and virtue together tightly, and pain and pleasure together with happiness; but fails to acknowledge that these things are so personal, that they cannot always be learned or taught. If something that causes pain is virtuous, then they can never be a virtuous person, for they can never find happiness in it. Also, if everything that gives some happiness is somehow right, then he nullifies his belief in akrasia. The fact is, that much of what he says seems to border on hedonism. Therefore, Aristotle’s greatest flaw is his inability to reconcile his contradicting beliefs in virtues.