It has been argued that moral
particularism is simply not a legitimate moral
theory, but is an antitheory. If traditional
ethical theory’s aim is to give a
concrete method of decision-making, a universal morality that would dictate
to us every action we must take to be a moral person, then
particularism would by definition be an antitheory. There are other objectives of ethical
theory, however, which particularism does present solutions for. I would like
to assert the legitimacy of the moral particularist’s theory, as well as refute its
interpretation as an antitheory, yet I am hesitant to suggest its
implementation into society. There are several conditions the discussion of
which will lead us to the conclusion that in order for moral particularism to be
effectuated at all, it would have to be done so in conjunction with other
principle-based ethical theories.
Before attempting to prove the particularist position’s validity, it is
important to spend some time working out the most important features of it.
The most central aspect of particularism, as well as its point of divergence
from classical generalist theories, is the theory’s conception of moral rules
and
principles. Russ Shafer-Landau defines his conception of a moral rule as
follows, “A moral rule states or expresses a relation claimed to obtain
between a moral property and other, grounding properties that are correlated
with its instantiation. The correlation between moral properties and their
grounds is always alleged to be universal.”
Essentially Shafer, as well as many other ethicists, are claiming a moral
rule or principle to be a statement that universally categorizes all actions of a
particular type as either right or wrong. If we were to take a commonly agreed
upon principle such as ‘do not kill’ as an example, this would mean that every
single action of killing would be a wrong action, no matter the situation or
context. Do we really believe that there is no situation in which bending or
breaking such a principle would be morally acceptable? Despite any
redeeming features or qualities the situation may have, believers of this
‘absolute’ conception of moral rules claim that every action of killing would
be morally wrong overall.
Such a conception of moral rules immediately sparks a response from
the particularists, who present convincing arguments for its rejection.
According to the absolute conception of moral principles there cannot be any
conflict between reasons for or against performing a given action. If there
emerges a situation in which two absolute principles conflict, one of the
principles must be abandoned entirely, which in turn leaves no room in this
conception for conflict. Additionally, if all of our reasons for performing an
action were specified in absolute principles, these principles would also come
into a conflict, the outcome of which would simply disprove one of the
conflicting principles.
Absolute principles are to be unconditionally adhered to, and thus the
rejection of such a principle in this manner would refute the validity of any
absolute principles. Cases in which there are moral reasons both for and
against certain actions, then, cannot be effectively dealt with under the
framework of the absolute principalist, leading the particularist to claim that
it does not follow for morality to simply be a system of absolute principles or
rules.
There are many ethicists who hold a much different conception of moral
principles that is also worth examination. W.D. Ross is one such philosopher,
claiming that moral rules are in fact not absolute, but rather of prima facie
relevance. “… what I am speaking of is an objective fact involved in the nature
of a situation, or more strictly in an element of its nature, though not, as duty
proper does, arising from its whole nature.” (Ross, 20) His theory allows more
than one principle to apply simultaneously to a given case, for he insists a
prima facie duty to be involved in only a certain aspect of its nature. If we
again use the principle not to kill others as an example, if an action requires
us to kill it counts against that action; that is to say the action is simply worse
if it involves killing.
Though Ross’s conception of moral principles is more appealing than that of
the absolutist, the particularist is still inclined to reject it. His theory may
leave the room for conflict between principles whereas the absolute principle
theories do not, yet it takes for granted that fundamental morally relevant
features have both universal relevance and universal polarity.
Mark Timmons offers “The Universal Relevance Thesis” in order to clarify
Ross’s assumption. “According to the Universal Relevance Thesis: If a feature
is a fundamental morally relevant nonmoral feature, then it is morally relevant
in any context in which it is present.” (Timmons, 248) In other words, if we
must take into account the breaking of a promise in one case we must take it
into account for every case in which it exists...