On 7 August 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S. Marines)
landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Island in the eastern
Solomon
Islands. The landings were meant to deny their use to the Japanese as bases.
From the eastern Solomons, Japanese
forces threatened the supply routes between
the U.S. and Australia. The Allies also wanted to use the islands as starting
points for a campaign to recapture the Solomons, isolate the major Japanese
base at Rabaul, and support the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings
initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.
The overall commander of Allied naval forces in the
Guadalcanal and Tulagi operation was U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. He
also commanded the carrier task groups providing air cover. U.S. Rear Admiral
Richmond K. Turner commanded the amphibious fleet that delivered the 16,000
Allied troops to Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Also under Turner was British Admiral
Victor Crutchley''s screening force of eight cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and
five minesweepers. This force was to protect Turner''s "amphibs" and
provide gunfire support for the landings. Crutchley commanded his force of
mostly American ships from the heavy cruiser HMAS Australia as his flagship.
The Allied landings took the Japanese by surprise. The
Allies secured Tulagi, nearby islets Gavutu and Tanambogo, and the airfield
under construction on Guadalcanal by nightfall on August 8. On August 7 and
August 8, Japanese
aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious
forces several times, setting afire the U.S. transport ship George F. Elliot
(which sank later) and heavily damaging the destroyer USS Jarvis.In these air
attacks, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft,
including 14 carrier fighter aircraft.
Australian cruiser Canberra (center left) protects three
Allied transport ships (background and center right) unloading troops and
supplies at Tulagi.
Concerned over the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft
strength, "anxious" about the threat to his carriers from further
Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ships'' fuel levels, Fletcher
announced that he would be withdrawing his carrier task forces on the evening
of August 8.
Some historians contend that Fletcher''s fuel situation
wasn''t at all critical but that Fletcher implied that it was to justify his
withdrawal from the battle area.Fletcher''s biographer notes that Fletcher
concluded that the landing was a success and that no important targets for
close air support were at hand. But concerned over the loss of 21 of his
carrier fighters, he assessed that his carriers were threatened by
torpedo-bomber strikes and wanting to refuel before Japanese naval forces
arrived, withdrew as he had previously forewarned Turner and Vandegrift.
Turner, however, believed that Fletcher understood that he was to provide air
cover until all the transports were unloaded on August 9.
Even though the unloading was going slower than planned,
Turner decided that without carrier air cover, he would have to withdraw his
ships from Guadalcanal. He planned to unload as much as possible during the
night and depart sometime during the next day.