"Recently, we have seen a pattern emerge in Indo-Pakistani dealings over Kashmir: Pakistan urges India to begin serious negotiations to resolve the issue in hopes of gaining territorial adjustments. India reacts coldly and instead negotiates with the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), the main Kashmiri separatist alliance. The APHC is delighted to talk to
New Delhi, but says it wants Islamabad in on the discussions. New Delhi responds by dragging its feet, which leads to renewed attacks by Kashmiri militants. India then blames Pakistan for the attacks and Islamabad responds by urging India to negotiate." This is part of the analysis of Stratfor, the US based intelligence think tank that has analysed the four-point formula offered recently by Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to India for a resolution of the Kashmir issue. The analysis suggests a level of awareness that the offer has less to do with Kashmir and more to do with President Musharraf’s own efforts to deflect attention from his growing insecurities at home, and bring the Kashmir issue back on the burner. Stratfor, like the intelligence agencies in India, does not seem to think that there is much to the offer that it points out has been made several times before by the Pakistani general in his memoirs and elsewhere, but that the timing is of some consequence. Significantly, Stratfor has taken note of the fact that the Nato forces have not been able to contain resurgent Taliban activity in Afghanistan and President Musharraf’s stock at home is particularly low at the moment. In making this offer publicly, he has sought to project Pakistan as the flexible partner willing to do business as against a rigid India, but more important than that, he has used a non-existent
proposal to try and gather support from within Kashmir. He has also tried to deflect criticism about Pakistan’s support for militants through the proposal — he has often floated proposals through interviews to the Indian media — by giving the impression that he is still in control. Kashmir leaders have reacted predictably to the proposal. And much of what Stratfor has observed is in play already. The media is already carrying reports about a possible dialogue between the Hurriyat leader Mirwaiz Omar Farooq and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, with President Musharraf having been successful in bringing Kashmir back into focus. He knows how to play the media, and is more astute than the Indian leaders, as he always appears to confide in the journalist and in the process triggers off a wake of speculation and media guessing of which Kashmir becomes the central part. It is unlikely that even a seemingly impulsive leader like the Pakistani general will announce proposals that are under the active consideration of both governments. Stratfor might be right in interpreting the proposal as a desperate ruse by President Musharraf to divert attention from his own problems, or conversely, the intent is indeed to put the proposal into the public discourse and judge the reactions from both sides. There is a little bit of Prime Minister Singh’s earlier proposal of making borders irrelevant in the new formula, just enough to give it a hint of authenticity. Demilitarisation is also not a proposal out of the blue, as India has acknowledged this as a possibility, but linked it to an end to terrorism. That means that it can be placed on the table provided the violence levels in Kashmir and the rest of India come down, and Islamabad is able to demonstrate its control over the militants to ensure this happens. The new part of the Musharraf proposal then is the joint mechanism that, by the way, has been under discussion in the back channels, although not in quite the form that the general seems to suggest. In that his is more in the nature of a final announcement that a government in India will find difficult to propose until and unless it is preceded by joint mechanisms on seemingly unobtrusive and more acceptable issues like health and education. So what can emerge sooner than we think, are proposals for both Kashmirs to set up universities or hospitals through joint mechanisms that will include representatives from New Delhi and Islamabad. Significant in President Musharraf’s comments is the observation that independence for Kashmir is no longer an option. The tragedy of the story is that while New Delhi is engaged in vigorous talks with Pakistan on the possible
solution for Jammu and Kashmir as this will bring international acclaim, it is doing little to nothing to establish strong and irreversible links with Srinagar. Various interlocutors are at work, but there has been little to suggest that the gap in communication has been bridged. Distrust and suspicion continue to mar relations, with every effort to break the ice ending in yet another freeze. New Delhi, for some reason, finds it very difficult to talk to its own people, particularly if they are perceived as critical and in the opposition. Political leaders at the top are so used to "yes men" that they shun and even decry discourse that does not support their perceptions and their views. Instead of looking at discourse as a way to break down the walls between the government and the people, those in power insist on using the pretext of dialogue to force their opinion on the
people instead of finding a common meeting ground. If governments had been more sensitive to the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast — our border states — how strong India would have been today in resisting foreign intervention. The reason why we are weak and have to talk about "solutions" to others is because we have failed miserably to offer a "solution" to our own citizens. It is late but never too late if the intent is good and the strategy clear. Unfortunately, both are suspect, with New Delhi under successive governments unable to work out a cohesive, lasting strategy for the Indian border states. The Northeast is virtually ignored, with key states left to the Army to run, while in Jammu and Kashmir the Indian political leadership has been unable to resist the temptation to exploit the differences for communal ends. A strange mindset is evident in national security adviser M.K. Narayanan’s recent comments on terrorism, and religion has always dogged New Delhi’s relations with Srinagar, with governments reluctant to deal with the people as people and not as political cards to be played at will. Pakistan’s declared interest in Jammu and Kashmir has crippled political decision making here, with late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rushing to the United Nations, his daughter the late Indira Gandhi unable to come to terms with the "nationalism" of Sheikh Abdullah, and more recently, the BJP-led NDA government using the communal card to reap benefits in the rest of India, while the Congress-led UPA government continues to hover between suspicion and confused intent. Unfortunately, in its misguided wisdom, New Delhi has taken the view that a solution to Kashmir must be announced in Islamabad. This solution will never be permanent or lasting or even acceptable. The solution has to come from within. The question is not of making borders irrelevant, no matter how beautiful that sounds, but of at least ensuring that the borders are permeable and not rigid walls coming between the people. It is amazing how easily politicians drift from one extreme — where the people of divided Kashmir were not able to meet their relatives on the other side at all — to the other end, where they do not want borders at all, even though the distrust and suspicion continue to exist and is even promoted at different levels by the state.
By: Seema Mustafa
Source: The Asian Age
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