1st June - 15 June 2008
Abstract from an article in < COVERT > :
Strategic Imperative
Brahma Chellaney
Hush-Hush is BUSH Word on n-deal
Three years after the much hyped " historic breakthrough " in US Indian relations , when the Indo
US Deal was signed ,the deal has progressed with more conditions
and greater the consequent imperative to keep key elements under
wraps.
,Assuming PM is prepared to ignore the Left's objections to the deal and break relations with them , the deal’s future remains uncertain. Taking for granted , Prime Minister
Manmohan
Singh is prepared for the sacrifice of this Govt by taking the deal
to the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency, there
is no guarantee that the deal will take effect without attracting more
odious conditions at the subsequent stages involving the 45-nation
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and the US Congress .The deal has already
divided India and the possibility to get the final clearances without
further grating conditions seems remote. and a showdown with the Left
will break the present government without guaranteeing a final deal on
largely palatable terms.
In any event, such a strategically important deal will lock India in perpetual,
legally irrevocable commitments with the IAEA and simultaneously arm the US with leverage with the contingency of it turned into a partisan issue domestically.
Just as the Bush
administration ensured congressional passage of the Hyde Act with bipartisan
support,
Prime Minster (based on his promise long ago )
— should obtain a broad national consensus in support of the deal before
going ahead further. In proceeding without such
consensus would be a betrayal of national trust. and would be further
doubly ironical: Not only Indian Parliament has
been denied keen scrutiny of the nuances of the deal closely whereas
the US Congress will get a second chance to examine ' in its final
form,..
Bush administration’s gag order prohibiting written responses
to congressional questions exposes their
attempt to keep the Indian public in the dark
on the deal’s larger and long-term implications.
With New Delhi revealing very little , even from
the beginning, the Indian public had to depend on US disclosures to
understand the various twists and turns in a continuing saga. But
recently no new information is available, as US officials are
tight-lipped under instructions from administration not to reveal anyinformation.
It is all the more surprising that a Deal between the world’s largest and most-powerful democracies, hush-hush
is the word on both sides. New Delhi’s has refused to
explain to Parliament and the public why it has willingly accepted an array of
conditions under the bilateral 123 Agreement ranging from India’s grant of an
open-ended right to the supplier to suspend supplies forthwith simply by issuing
a one-year termination notice, IN sharp contrast to the absence of any dispute-settlement
mechanism such as an international arbitration tribunal that finds mention in the
Japan-US 123 Agreement.
The revised views of A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and Brajesh Mishra., who have turned from'
from being a critic to a proponent of the deal , ,without explaining their volte
face. (except their cryptic remark ' that the deal is no longer
detrimental to Indian interests '), without willing to share any
new facts or information with the public. appear to be fishy.
Kalam , who had raised troubling questions earlier . now lends support to a deal that
drags India through the backdoor into the CTBT.He has declared, “If at any time
there was a fear that national security would be compromised … we can at any
time withdraw (from the deal).” which is quite contrary to facts.
The agreement makes explicitly clear that once it enters into
force India cannot free itself of its obligation to maintain international
inspections in perpetuity on its entire civil nuclear programme. Can pompous
personal opinions help sideline or suppress hard facts?
India still
does not have minimum deterrence against China, how justifiable is New Delhi’s
focus on deal-making rather than on deterrent-building? And will playing
hush-hush rescue a misbegotten deal? <>
konthai
(Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy
Research, New Delhi)
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