Background
The outbreak of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza in domestic poultry and wild birds has caused global
concern over the possible evolution of a novel human strain . If such a strain emerges, and is not controlled at source ,, a pandemic is likely to result. Health policy in most countries will then be focused on reducing morbidity and mortality.
Methods and Findings
We estimate the expected reduction in primary attack rates for different household-based
interventions using a mathematical model of influenza
transmission within and between households. We show that, for lower transmissibility strains ,, the combination of household-based quarantine, isolation of cases outside the household, and targeted prophylactic use of anti-virals will be highly effective and likely feasible across a range of plausible transmission scenarios. For example, for a basic reproductive number (the average number of people infected by a typically infectious individual in an otherwise susceptible population) of 1.8, assuming only 50 compliance, this combination could reduce the infection (symptomatic) attack rate from 74 (49) to 40 (27), requiring peak quarantine and isolation levels of 6.2 and 0.8 of the population, respectively, and an overall anti-viral stockpile of 3.9 doses per member of the population. Although contact tracing may be additionally effective, the resources required make it impractical in most scenarios.
Conclusions
National influenza pandemic preparedness plans currently focus on reducing the impact associated with a constant attack rate, rather than on reducing transmission. Our findings suggest that the additional benefits and resource requirements of household-based interventions in reducing average levels of transmission should also be considered, even when expected levels of compliance are only moderate.