Twenty-five years ago, in the autumn of 1978, Chinese and Japanese governments signed a joint communiqué for the establishment
of diplomatic relations, a treaty of peace and friendship. The negotiations for the treaty had been extremely long and hard. Serious disagreement on the anti-hegemony clauses had prolonged the process. The key reason for antagonism was the détente policy the U.S. government adopted toward the Soviet Union. First of all, the policy bro ke the U. S. balance in relations with China and the Soviet Union and wavered the U.S.-China Para-Ally on the basis of the Shanghai Communiqué. In sharp contrast to the great progress in the U.S-Soviet relations symbolized by the Helsinki Agreement, Sino-U.S. relations almost came to a stop in the first three years after President Nixon's resignation. Secondly, the détente policy contributed to the changes of political geography on relations among the big powers in the Far-East region. The hostility between China-U.S. as one party and the Soviet Union as the other returned to the intense Sino-Soviet Union confrontation. Thirdly, the détente made Japanese government change its diplomatic policy toward China. In order to keep pace with the U.S., Migi cabinet adopted an equal-distance diplomacy towards China and the Soviet Union, which was totally different from the diplomacy of seeking equilateral triangle relations respectively with China and t he U.S in the Tanaka era. This policy to link Sino-Japanese relations with the Japanese-Soviet Union relation and put them on the equal position made up a problem on the anti-hegemony clauses. The failure of the detente policy reconfirmed the strategic value of Sino-U.S. relations. The U.S. government revised its China policy and wished that Japan would finish the negotiations with China on reaching the treaty as soon as possible. At the same time, the U.S. supported the idea of putting the anti-hegemony clause into the treaty. The revision affected Japan. The growing threat from the Soviet Union and the increasingly stable po litical situation in China were another two factors for Japan's final decision. The Soviet Union's threat made Japan realize that it would be in the same boat with China, and share the same fate. The gradual stability of China predicted huge potentials in the Chinese market, which created the initiative for Japan to break the deadlock on the anti-hegemony clauses. On the other side, the new domestic political line required China to sign the treaty at an early date with a flexible and practical attitude. There was also an increase of positive elements in the in ternational community. With Mr. Deng Xiaoping's promotion, the negotiations for the Peace and Friendship Treaty between China and Japan finally came to an end.