The author defines the direction of reflection to "locate such problems as they arise or omit." Thus we have the initial distinction of Knowing into two general camps: a) Speculative Knowledge (Philosophy - Rational and Theology - Religious) and b) The Sciences (Mathematics and Empirical). In this context, the author conceives of epistemology as "reflective and methodical study of knowledge, its organization, its training, its operation and its intellectual products."Hence we have three types of Epistemology: a) epistemology Global (both knowledge, taken in general), b) private Epistemology (also both knowledge, taken in private), and c) Specific Epistemology (when studying so close a well-defined discipline of knowledge).From there the subdivision that the author attributes to contemporary epistemologies, due to them having their primacy in the study of the subject, the object or the interaction between them. Again, the author points out that the focus falls more heavily on Interaction and passes to the more detailed study of some of its most significant thinkers, beginning with J. Piaget and genetic epistemology. It can be defined as "the study of the constitution of valid knowledge." Constitution, here, includes "access conditions" and "proper constitutive conditions" which relate to the validity of knowledge. Thus, Piaget wants to demonstrate that science is only if we have the following elements: a) elaboration of facts, b) logical-mathematical formalization, and c) experimental control. Of course, Piaget moves away from the more philosophical speculation rather than a scientific epistemology in favor, he said, to avoid "ideological contamination".We, then, the Historical Epistemology of Bachelard, to whom science "is not representation, but act," which leads him to assert that "it is contemplating, but building, creating ... that the spirit comes to the truth." That away, as well Japiassu remember, the notion of spectacle. In this design, epsitemologia science is seen as "the systematic study of how the concepts of 'truth' and 'reality' should be given a new direction." Revolution, therefore, Bachelard argues that "science is not the pleonasm of experience," but she is against science, showing that a fund is in error that there is something true.Following, we Epistemology "rationalist-scientific" in Popper. Two questions arise: a) how can the development of a scientific theory from observations always finite in number? and b) how it is possible to establish the "truth" of a theory relying only on observational bases'. In this second problem is that we find the so-called "value" of scientific theories, and to have more epistemological approach and also opposed to logical empiricism is that the author focuses his analysis here. Therefore, it is raised the principle of "verifiability" which states that scientific principles should be demonstrable and which antagonizes Popper with his idea of falsification, ie, the principle that an empirical statement can only be forged in order conclusive.
Soon after, the author brings the Archaeological Epistemology by Michel Foucault. The main quest of this epistemology, especially the work Les mots et les choses, is to understand the relationship of the humanities with the "underlying pool of knowledge and culture that may be called pre-scientific knowledge, opinion, or episteme." Foucault's mission is to "present the global agency of the humanities" in the face of what he called "triedo of knowledge" that becomes an epistemological space in three dimensions: a) The axis of mathematics, b) The axis Life Sciences (Biology, Economics and Language Sciences), and c) The axis of philosophical reflection. From it, you go to a historical tour that runs from Antiquity to the Renaissance, Classic coming to Positivism.Among the criticisms of archaeological epistemology, the main one is the total exclusion, according to the author, Foucault makes the real man, to consider it as a concept only. The author counters this criticism Sartre, for whom "The essential thing is not what made the man, but he did what he did." And he, the man does is his own story.Next comes the approach of Critical Epistemology, the result of historical reflection of its own scientists about metier. Its corporate purpose is the social responsibility of scientists, rescuing the question of the virtue of science. Increasingly approximate the circles of power, scientists find themselves faced with complex dilemmas that lay bare their dependence and question the "immaculate conception of science" in the words of Nietzsche.Finally, the conclusion, the author explains about the direction of philosophy, emphasizing the key role that should have reflection against everything that was placed earlier. Tellingly, the author states that the philosophy "can not reflect on ideas, but about realities," which makes orphan object of study just to reflect on "the objects of other disciplines." "That's why" he continues, "it is always a reflection on science, not about or for them." Here, finally, the author affirms the role of epistemology, namely, to "unmask the illusion of those who wished to give science a global importance that suppresses philosophy", since philosophy must "create a common horizon that deny to any confinement, "without forgetting the human obedience.